A labor market tautology says that any change in labor usage can be decomposed into a movement along a marginal productivity schedule and a shift of the schedule. I calculate this decomposition for the recession of 2008, assuming an aggregate CobbDouglas marginal productivity schedule, and find that all of the decline in employment and hours since December 2007 is a movement along the schedule. This finding suggests that a reduction in labor supply and/or an increase in labor market distortions is a major factor in the 2008 recession. The decline in aggregate consumption suggests that the reduction in labor supply (if any) is neither a wealth nor an intertemporal substitution effect. Some households may face significant financial disincentives for working.
A variety of explanations have been offered for previous recessions: adverse productivity shocks (Kydland and Prescott, 1982) , a surge in the demand for "liquidity" (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Lucas, 2008) , a collapse in international trade (Crucini and Kahn, 1996) , and a stock market crash ([x] ) are among them. Which, if any, of these explanations apply today? This paper begins an answer to the question by decomposing the 2008 employment reduction into three types of potential "causes": productivity shocks that reduce labor and productivity, wealth and intertemporal substitution effects that reduce labor and raise consumption, and labor distortions and labor preferences that raise productivity and reduce labor. I conclude that the 2008 recession is qualitatively different from previous severe recessions because productivity growth (adjusted for changes in the amount of labor employed) was normal while labor "supply" (defined more rigorously below) shifted to the left.
Analytically, my decomposition is most like that of Katz and Murphy (1992) , who look at changes over time in the relative amounts and productivity of skilled and unskilled labor in order to determine the relative importance of supply and demand shocks. In terms of substance, this paper is about the changes over time in the overall levels of labor and labor productivity, which raises the possibilities of tax distortions, wealth effects, and intertemporal substitution effects that would be less important for understanding one education group's changes relative to another. In this regard, my analysis is more like that of Chari et al (2007) , who also consider capital market fluctuations and total factor productivity. Gali et al (2003) , Mulligan (2002 Mulligan ( , 2005 are three other papers using the supply-demand decomposition to quantify labor market distortions over time; Hall (1997) uses it to quantify labor preference shifts.
Section I displays the basic time series used to make the decomposition: aggregate labor, consumption, and productivity per hour. Section II considers the degree to which productivity per hour changed due to shifts of the marginal productivity schedule, or movements along it. Section III considers the co-movements of labor and consumption in order to determine whether labor reductions were a wealth or intertemporal substitution effect (that would move consumption and leisure together) or some other shock to preferences or labor market distortions. Section IV compares these results to analogous calculations for previous recessions. Section V offers a possible reason why labor supply behavior might have changed: mortgage modifications that followed the housing market crash. Section VI concludes.
I. Monthly Indicators of Aggregate Economic Quantities
Figure 1 displays monthly measures of labor input since January 2007. The red and green series are civilian and nonfarm payroll employment, respectively, measured in thousands on the left axis (civilian employment is shifted by 7,000 in order to be displayed on the same axis with nonfarm payroll employees). The blue series is the aggregate hours index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which is a combination of numbers employed and weekly hours worked per employee. The labor input series seem to peak in December 2007, which is why the NBER dating committee declared December 2007 to be the beginning of the recession. The usual measure stops in Q3 (July, August, and September). Two of the employment declines shown in Figure 1 , and one of the consumption declines shown in Figure 2 , occurred in Q4. Because productivity is a critical part of my economic interpretation of these events, I have attempted to estimate monthly productivity from the monthly personal income data. The green series is aggregate personal income minus transfers divided by the PCE deflator and by the aggregate hours index, and transformed to an index itself with a value of 100 in September 2007 (to match the productivity index in that month). The two series have a number of similarities, as might be expected to the degree that monthly personal income net of transfers is a good indicator of monthly GDP. Table 1 [forthcoming] displays a time series regression for log BEA productivity using the quarterly data since 2000. The independent variables are a linear time trend, the lag of the dependent variable, and the log of the personal income variable for the first two months of the quarter. The last variable had a positive and economically significant coefficient. That is -if this relationship holds up -today we can expect Q4 BLS productivity (not released until the end of January 2009) to be higher because real hourly personal income is high for Oct and Nov.
2 I note below where this expectation affects my economic interpretation of events.
II. Movements Along an Aggregate Marginal Productivity Schedule

II.A. Stability of the Marginal Productivity Schedule during the 2008 Recession
Let y t denote output per hour in month t, and n t denote aggregate labor input.
Consider the definition:
2 Real hourly person income is high in October and November both because hours are low and because real aggregate personal income is higher than it was in Q3.
So far, equation (1) 
To the extent that the schedule shown in Figure 4 is the aggregate marginal productivity schedule, changes in A measure the amount by which the schedule shifted over time. shows that most of the change in labor input over time is a change in labor supply or labor market distortions rather than a shift in the marginal productivity schedule. When viewed through the lens of any model in which aggregate output is a Cobb-Douglas function of labor input with elasticity 0.7, aggregate adverse productivity shocks do not seem to be an important impulse in this recession.
II.B. Marginal Productivity Shifts during Previous Recessions
Figures 6 and 7 display the change in the log productivity (ln y t ) and log marginal productivity residual (ln A t ) for the recessions of 1974, 1981, 1990, 2001, and 2008 . For each recession, the productivity residual is shown relative to its value in the quarter prior 3 Recall that average and marginal productivity are proportional when production is Cobb-Douglas. 4 For the purposes of illustration, Oct-Nov 2008 productivity is assumed to be the same as 2008 Q3.
to the NBER peak. Productivity normally increases in non-recession periods, although the amount has varied from decade to decade. Productivity also increased in the 2001 and 2008 recessions. More notable are the earlier three recessions shown in Figure 6 in which productivity declined (1970s and 1980s) or was pretty flat (1990s). As shown in Figure 7 , productivity failed to increase during the three earlier recessions because of shifts of the marginal productivity schedule.
When viewed through the lens of a model in which aggregate output is a CobbDouglas function of labor input with elasticity 0.7, aggregate productivity shocks do not seem to be an important impulse in this recession or in the 2001 recession. But adverse productivity shocks were part of the impulses of the three earlier recessions.
III. Neither Wealth nor Intertemporal Substitution Explains the "Supply" Shift
III.A. Consumption and Leisure have Moved in Opposite Directions
In theory, movements along the marginal productivity schedule can occur for a variety of reasons: wealth effects, intertemporal substitution effects, preference changes, and labor market distortions are among them. The wealth effect explanation says that people work less because they feel richer. The intertemporal substitution effect says that people work less in 2008 because they view 2008 as a relatively bad time to work and produce income, either because the return to saving is low or because they expect future labor productivity to be even higher than it is now. Both the wealth and substitution effect theories imply that consumption is high during the recession (Barro and King, 1984) .
Figure 2 easily rejects the wealth and intertemporal substitution effect explanations because consumption expenditure has been low in this recession. In other words, wealth and intertemporal substitution effects seem to be moving the economy down the marginal productivity schedule, and the net result is less labor, so something else must be moving the economy up the schedule even more.
III.B. A Labor Market Metric for Consumption Declines
Putting more structure on preferences for consumption and work permit me to quantify the size of the wealth and intertemporal substitution effects, and thereby the size of the leftward labor supply shift (or labor market distortion change) that would have occurred absent those effects. In particular, I assume that the month t marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is proportional to the ratio of real consumption per person to leisure time per adult:
where c t is aggregate real consumption, P t is population (adults and children), N t is the adult population, n t is total labor time, and T is the total available time of each adult.
Absent labor market distortions and other determinants of the marginal rate of substitution, the marginal rate of substitution would equal marginal labor productivity, which is itself equal to average productivity times labor's share (which I take to be 0.7).
As explained by Mulligan (2005) , changes in the gap between (3) and average productivity y t are therefore measures of changes in the combined effect of changes in labor market distortions and other determinants of the marginal rate of substitution.
Denoting that gap as (1-τ t ), its changes can be calculated as:
In words, each percentage point that consumption declines is a percentage point that distortions must increase in order to explain a given path for labor and productivity.
With the data I have, I cannot determine whether the gap (1-τ t ) captures preferences or distortions. Henceforth, for the purposes of brevity, I refer to -ln (1-τ t ) as "the labor market distortion." is the same as its value for 2008 Q3) the supply shift term ln (1-τ) fell 0.053 log points.
IV. Labor Market Distortions During Recessions
If instead labor had risen 0.054 log points, the distortion term would have been constant over time and log average productivity would have been essentially unchanged (specifically, -0.001 log points). In other words, the labor supply distortion not only prevented an increase in labor that would have been consistent with the consumption drop, but actually reduced labor. 7 In this sense, the labor supply distortion is responsible for more than 100% of the employment decline since December 2007.
V. Mortgage Modifications: A Possible Source of Reduced Labor Supply
Both labor and consumption have fallen in this recession even while productivity rose. As shown in Figure 11 , the labor distortion -or labor supply shift -apparently "Citigroup will modify mortgages to help people avoid foreclosure along the lines of an FDIC plan that was put into effect at IndyMac Bank… struggling home borrowers pay interest rates of about three percent for five years. Rates are reduced so that borrowers aren't paying more than 38 percent of their pretax income on housing." (Aversa, 2008) Consider a family with a mortgage that is underwater in the amout b, and However, if b were large enough that point Z had more consumption than point Y, then 9 http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2008-12-11-foreclosures_N.htm the budget constraint would slope up over some range, as shown in Figure 13 . Quite simply, work incentives are non-existent in Figure 13 and just terrible in Figure 12 . It is still unknown how many households might recognize and find relevant the modification part of the budget sets shown in Figures 12 and 13. 
VI. Conclusions
Employment, hours, and consumption declined significantly in 2008, while labor productivity rose. I decomposed these changes into three types of "causes":
• productivity shocks that reduce labor and productivity,
• wealth and intertemporal substitution effects that reduce labor and raise consumption, and • (unmeasured) labor distortions and labor preferences that raise productivity and reduce labor It is well known (e.g., Barro and King, 1984; Hall, 1997 ) that previous business cycles do not appear to be wealth or intertemporal substitution effects because both labor and consumption decline. The 2008 recession is no different in this regard.
What is unique about the 2008 recession is the relative importance of productivity and unmeasured labor distortions. Figures 14 and 15 are scatter plots contrasting this recession and previous ones along these dimensions. Each recession is one data point in the chart. The horizontal axis measures the change in the log productivity residual from one quarter prior to the NBER peak to the second or fourth quarter following the NBER peak (Figures 14 and 15, respectively) . The vertical axis measures the change in the unmeasured labor distortion (also in log points). The first three recessions each had productivity shifts that were less than experienced during non-recession years. The 2008 recession is unusual in that it has normal productivity shifts (so far) throughout the 
